REVISING THE CONSTITUTION

OF PENNSYLVANIA.

In view of the Act of June 4, 1919, creating The Commission on Constitutional Amendment and Revision, I have
thought that lawyers will be interested in a brief summary
of the questions which are likely to come before that body
and before a constitutional convention, if such a convention
shall be called. The consideration of these questions is
plainly a matter of prime importance.
Since our separation from Great Britain we have had
three State Constitutions in the sense in which we now use
that word, one adopted in 1790, the second in 1838, and the
present instrument in 1873, taking effect on January I, 1874.
The first and second lasted forty-eight and thirty-five years
respectively, and the third is nearing its forty-sixth birthday.
Conditions and ideas have changed and the fundamental
law as well as the statute law must change to meet the times.
The Constitution of the United States was so drawn that
it has never needed an entire revision, although it has several
times been amended. But in the matter of our State Constitutions we have not been so fortunate.
A constitution should have two parts. It should create
the framework of a government and it should set limitations
upon the powers of the government which it has created.
In both of these respects it is time to consider whether important changes should not be made in the Constitution of
Pennsylvania. In seventeen years we have had twenty
amendments, and every session of the General Assembly
sees numerous efforts, successful and unsuccessful, to put
into motion the machinery of amendment.
The various amendments in regard to the borrowing
capacity of cities well illustrate the need for constitutional
provisions broad enough to care for modern needs and at the
same time strict enough to protect the rights of person and
property. The original restriction upon the borrowing power
of municipalities would have prevented Philadelphia and
(120)
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other cities from acquiring proper transit and other public
facilities. Accordingly four separate amendments to Article IX of the Constitution have been adopted, each intended to increase the borrowing power to meet modern
requirements. Each of these amendments was of course
submitted at two successive sessions of the General Assembly
and finally to all the voters of the State. A constitutional
limitation upon the borrowing power of municipalities is
obviously wise and necessary, because it prevents the voters
who are not troubled with property from bankrupting their
more successful neighbors by the simple process of large
loans and huge taxes. And it is equally obvious that the
exact nature of this limitation should now be fixed with
some degree of permanence in the light of modern conditions. A study of this situation by the Constitutional
Commission will no doubt lead to the solution of the difficulty. It will then become unnecessary to ask all the voters
of the State every two years to pass upon a question as to
which probably ninety per cent. of them are in blank ignorance.
The Constitutional Commission may propose amendments or they may submit a .revised constitution and recommend the calling of a constitutional convention. In
either event it is important for lawyers to think seriously of
the problems involved and to help the process of change by
well-considered suggestions.
If a revised constitution shall be suggested by the Commission, I hope that the revision may be in the direction of
brevity. Our present constitution is almost twice as long
as the Constitution of the United States, largely because it
contains much matter which is properly statutory and not
constitutional in character. Every lawyer will remember
his surprise in finding in the State constitution provisions
which he had first looked for among the Acts of Assembly.
Certainly the fundamental law should not contain provisions which may safely be left to legislative action. For
instance, it is hard to see why the precise method of charter-
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ing banks should be set forth in Article I6, Section ii. If
the Constitution provides a framework of government and
protects persons and property against sudden aggression,
either by official authority or by an unbalanced majority,
it has done its duty. The right to have our persons inviolate
and the right to acquire, use and save property form together the foundation of happiness. Without them, life
is of little account. So far as possible the Constitution
should be pared down to the bare essentials necessary to
protect them.
And there is another reason for compressing the instrument as much as possible. The draft to be submitted to the
voters will of course be that approved by a constitutional
convention, whose members will, during the sessions, become
to some extent experts in the questions involved. The
average citizen will have to rely almost entirely upon the
judgment of others in deciding how to vote. But so far as
possible the document should be intelligible to everyone,
and to be intelligible it must be short. The great length and
complexity of the proposed New York Constitution of 1915
is generally supposed to have contributed to its defeat at
the polls, in spite of the care with which it was drawn and
the high character of its sponsors. Certainly a constitution
should be able to commend itself to the common people by
its brevity and by the plain and fundamental importance of
each of its provisions.
It will be well now to take up in some detail the questions
which the Constitutional Commission will have to face and
with respect to which they will undoubtedly welcome the
thoughtful suggestions of all citizens.
I.

THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.

The provisions of this article have remained almost
unaltered since 1790.1 This fact in itself should insure the
greatest caution in the consideration of any proposal to
I Only two changes of any importance have been made since 179o. The
Constitution of 1874 in Section 7 makes absence of malice or negligence a defense
in indictments for libels relating to public matters; and in Section 17 forbids
the granting of irrevocable privileges by the Legislature.
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change any of them. Nevertheless certain questions deserve
thought.
(a) Social Legislation. The language of section i is
substantially equivalent in effect to the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Our constitution proclaims the
indefeasible rights of "enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and
reputation" and of pursuing happiness. Since the Supreme
Court of the United States has declared that a man's right
to earn his living is a property right,2 the protection of the
due process clause and of the State constitution appears to
be the same. But it is possible that the State Supreme Court
will take a position on social legislation different from the
position of the Supreme Court of the United States. It
might, for instance, declare a minimum wage act unconstitutional under the State constitution, although the Supreme Court of the United States has held by an equally
divided vote without opinion that the Oregon Minimum
Wage Act is not forbidden by the due process clause. 3 In
case of such a decision by the State court the act would
finally fail.
Should our State Constitution therefore contain a special
provision enabling the General Assembly to legislate with
respect to such subjects as minimum wage and health insurance? Such a provision would have to enumerate the kinds
of legislation to be permitted; otherwise the interpretation
of its language would fall upon the Supreme Court and the
present situation would be virtually unchanged.
No one can say what the final opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States will be in the minimum wage
matter, although, as now constituted, it would probably
favor the constitutionality of such legislation if another case
came up for determination. If the final opinion should be
adverse to such statutes, no provisions such as I have referred
to in a state constitution, would have any validity.
23 Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 53.
Stettler v. 0 'Hara & Simpson O 'Hara, 243 U. S. 629. See highly interesting article by Rome G. Brown, of counsel, in i Minnesota Law Review, 471.
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(b) Indictment. Certain rights of criminal defendants
should here be mentioned. Section 10 requires indictment
by a grand jury "for any indictable offense," and forbids
proceeding by information. An information is a proceeding
with which most Pennsylvania lawyers are not familiar.
It is an accusation of crime filed by the prosecuting attorney
in place of indictment by a grand jury. The purpose of
the constitutional provision is, of course, to protect the
citizen from the expense and ignominy of a criminal trial
unless a grand jury finds that the charge against him has
sufficient weight to justify such a trial. In Philadelphia an
average of from five to ten per cent. of the bills considered
by the grand jury are ignored.
If the proceeding by information is substituted for
the present system, the defendant will rely upon the district
attorney for protection instead of upon a grand jury. If
the district attorney thinks that there is proper ground for
a prosecution, he will prepare and present an indictment;
otherwise, he will refuse to do so. In the latter event it
should still be possible to have presentment by a grand jury,
to meet situations in which the district attorney may act
improperly. The testimony of judges, district attorneys,
and lawyers with experience in criminal work will be most
valuable in this connection.
(c) Courts Martial. A third and very important question arising under the Declaration of Rights was the subject of discussion in the New York State Constitutional
Convention of 1915. It was there proposed to add to the
usual provision forbidding the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, these words: "Nor shall any
military tribunal exercise jurisdiction over a civilian unless
engaged in military or naval service while the regularly
constituted state courts are open to administer justice."
The labor forces and others, including George W. Wickersham, 4 favored this provision, but it was rejected by a narrow
margin of fifteen votes. It was, of course, meant to prevent
4

Rev Rec. N. Y. Const. Com., 4o60.
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the trial of offenders by military commissions when martial
law had been declared to exist. The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia had in 1912 brought this matter
home to many citizens by deciding that certain civilians in
that situation had no right to trial by a civil court, and this
in spite of the provision of the State Constitution which
forbade any citizen to be "tried or punished by any military
court for any offense that is cognizable by the civil courts
of the state.5 It seems doubtful 'whether the Fourteenth
Amendment covers such a situation.6

An effort will inevitably be made to introduce such a
provision into our Constitution. Our natural civilian preference for civil courts induces us to favor it. The argument
on the other side, however, is strong, arising from the possible
necessity of preserving the existence of the State government
by the use of the most drastic measures.
When this matter comes up for final determination, the
fate of the proposed New York Constitution should not be
forgotten. The labor delegates to the convention which
framed that instrument asked for the provision guaranteeing trial in a civil court. When this was rejected they warned
the Convention that the labor forces of the State would
show their resentment by their votes. 7 Many competent
observers believe that the defeat of the constitution at the
polls was largely due to disregard of this warning.
One of the serious objections urged against the proposed
guarantee is the fact that rioters would be able to give bail
and immediately to engage in disorder, thus making the
criminal process temporarily useless. Under military law
there is no right of bail. This objection could be met by
permitting during times of serious disorder, the suspension
of the right of bail with respect to offenses forming part of
the general disorder, such as looting, burning or unlawful
assemblage.
6 See Nance

and Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 5I9.
6See ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 12, and opinion by Poffenbarger, P.J. in Nance

v. Brown, supra at 55i.
7See Revised Record N. Y. Cons. Comm., 4224 and 4318.
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(d) Jury Trial. Another question presented under the
Declaration of Rights is that of trial by jury. The Fourteenth Amendment in requiring due process of law does
not require trial by jury.8

But Article I, Section 6, of our

State Constitution declares that "trial by jury shall be as
heretofore and the right thereof remain inviolate." This
gives the right to a jury trial wherever that remedy existed
at the time of the adoption of the first State Constitution. 9
It is at least questionable whether this privilege should
extend to the many small civil actions in which the amount
involved scarcely justifies the time and expense necessary
to provide a jury for the litigants.
2.

THE LEGISLATURE.

(a) Delegation of Power. The question of the delegation
of legislative power is likely to come to life within the coming
years. There are two forms which such delegation may
assume. The General Assembly may delegate to a State
officer or commission the power to create what is practically
statute law; or the General Assembly may permit a local
unit to legislate for itself. The first of these two forms is
certainly vicious in principle, since, it leaves the citizen in
entire uncertainty and at the mercy of a man or of a very
small group of men with legislative power which he has not
entrusted to them. Such a condition offends our common
sense of fairness. It was necessary during the war to submit
to it in national matters, but happily the situation is fast
changing back again. The present State Constitution which
vests the legislative power of the Commonwealth in a General
Assembly has been construed as forbidding such delegations
of power. 10
The other form of delegation is the delegation of the
powers of local government to a local unit. This has to a
large extent been upheld in the local option case" and in
similar matters, but a statute allowing Pittsburgh City
8 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90.
9 Rhines v. Clark, .51 Pa. 96.
10O'Neil v. Ins. Co., 166 Pa. 72.
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Councils to create new departments in the city government
and to define their powers went further than the Supreme
Court wauld allow.12 On principle, there seems to be no
reason why delegations of legislative power in such cases
should not be unrestricted, so long as the fundamental personal and property rights of each citizen are protected.
(b) Two Houses. Questions of organization will also
arise in considering the General Assembly. Should the tradition of two houses be maintained? Its reproduction from
our European models of the eighteenth century was practically inevitable. But in the British government, for instance, the upper house represented and still represents a
class whose interests are distinct from those of the Commons.
In our country there is no such reason for the bi-cameral
form of legislature. In city governments it is almost obsolete. There is, however, the advantage derived from greater
delay and caution. The number of bills which pass one house
and thereafter enjoy perpetual rest in the bosom of a committee of the other house, shows that the necessity for passing
both houses is in itself often a guarantee of care and of proper
conservatism. Incidentally, we may question whether a unicameral state legislature would,'in the opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States, destroy the republican form of
government guaranteed to every state by the Federal Constitution.
(c) Proportional Representation. Those who are interested in proportional representation should study the last
three sections of Article II, which make its adoption practically impossible in the election of members of the General
Assembly. If proportional representation is desirable and
if there is any chance of wanting to put it into operation during
the next forty or fifty years, the appropriate constitutional
provisions should be made sufficiently elastic to allow of its
introduction.
11

507).

Locke's Appeal,

'Pittsburgh's

72

Pa. 491 (overruling Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa.

Petition, 138 Pa.

401.

128

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

3.

LEGISLATION.

(a) Special Legislation. The evils of local and special
legislation led to the constitutional prohibition of 1873 against
this form- of legislative enterprise. 'uring the session of
the General Assembly immediately preceding the adoption
of the present constitution nearly a hundred and fifty local
and special laws were enacted for the city of Philadelphia
alone. The Constitution now forbids such statutes upon
almost every conceivable subject. Of course, many efforts
have been made to evade the restriction by adopting some
sort of classification, since legislation within the bounds of
proper classification is not unconstitutional. The most ingenious of these efforts was the passage of an act which
required one week of court to be held each term in any city
of 8ooo or more situated in a county of over 6o,ooo and
distant more than twenty-seven miles from the county seat.
The city of Titusville in Crawford County was the only
city described by the act, and the Supreme Court rightly
13
declared the act unconstitutional.
The question of classification constantly recurs and is
usually difficult to settle. It is proper when, in the opinion
of the court, the purposes of the statute reasonable require
it. Accordingly the Supreme Court has allowed the cities
of the Commonwealth to be divided into three classes, but
has drawn the line at four. 14 Obviously, such classification
must stop somewhere, else the number of classes could be
made equal to the number of cities. But it puts a pretty
severe burden upon the courts to ask them to determine
what is and what is not reasonable classification. Can this
matter be determined in the constitution itself? If not, it
is undoubtedly best to leave the final decision where it now
rests.
(b) CharitableAppropriations. Few questions are more
serious than that of State aid to private charities. This
subject received careful consideration and was earnestly
Is Commonwealth

v. Patton, 88 Pa. 258.
14Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. 266.
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debated in the Convention of 1873, and as a result, two sections of the Constitution were adopted. These provide that
charitable appropriations cannot be made to individuals nor
to sectarian organizations, and that every charitable appropriation must be by a two-thirds vote of all the members
of each house. All of these limitations are obviously proper.
We should not want to see the General Assembly giving
$Io,ooo of State money to relieve the immediate necessities
of an indigent citizen, nor should we enjoy the spectacle of
denominational intrigue at every session of the Legislature.
But the question is constantly raised: Should any
charitable appropriation be permitted except to institutions
entirely under the control of the State? The average reader
will be interested to see how large such appropriations are.
Look at Smull's Legislative Handbook for 1918 and you
will find that the total appropriations for the two years 19171919 were, in round numbers, eighty-two million dollars, ten
per cent. of which went to charitable organizations not controlled by the State. A certain amount of supervision is
of course exercised over these organizations. The State
Board of Public Charities visits them and makes recommendations with respect to their appropriations. Legislative committees also examine to some extent the grounds
for requests for money. But there is no escape from the
conclusion that many millions of the people's money go
every year to private citizens who are not subject to control
in spending it.
Of course, this is by no means an unmixed evil. Hospitals, homes, schools and colleges are necessary and the
State is not able to conduct them all. Many have been for
years dependent on appropriations and would be crippled or
destroyed by a -sudden loss of that part of their incomes.
It would certainly be wise to make any change slowly; for
instance, by gradually reducing the total amount to be
available for this purpose. In three States-Colorado, Montana and Wyoming-appropriations to any charity not controlled by the State are forbidden.
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(c) Initiative, Referendum and Recall. Ten years ago
the initiative, referendum and recall were live political topics.
Today, in Pennsylvania at least, they are seldom spoken of.
Perhaps -legislatures have grown more responsive to the
will of the people, or perhaps the people realize that bringing
legislation into the voting booth does not improve the character of the legislation. The introduction into our constitution of these three instruments of government is not
likely to be strongly urged at this time.
4.

THE JUDICIARY.

It is natural that lawyers should appreciate more than
others the grave importance of constitutional provisions in
regard to the judiciary, for their daily work leads them to
realize the extent of the powers vested in the courts under
the American form of government.
(a) Appointment. In considering this matter of the
judiciary, the first question which suggests itself to most of
us is the question as to method of selection: Should our
judges be elected or appointed? I believe that most lawyers
will agree that appointment for a long term or during good
behavior is the preferable system, because it is likely to find
a higher type of man to serve on the bench.
But the decision of this question is intimately connected with another: Should our judges be loaded with
political, as distinguished from judicial, functions? Under
the present system they must appoint, for instance, the
Boards of Education in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, the
Boards of Revision of Taxes in Philadelphia and WilkesBarre, and must fill vacancies in the position of election
officer. The first two of these duties are certainly political,
for the principles which control the two bodies thus appointed
are of necessity the ordinary principles common to the administration of all political offices. So long as a judge is
required thus to participate to some extent in active politics,
there is fair ground for demanding that he should be elected.
Should we not have a constitutional provision forbidding
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the imposition of non-judicial duties upon judges, 15 and at
the same time provide for appointment instead of election?
(b) Procedure. It can be strongly argued that all matters of procedure should be left to the courts. Practice acts
would then emanate from the Supreme Court, or from a
State Board of Judges, instead of from the General Assembly,
and the necessity of asking each session of the Legislature
to tinker with matters of procedure would cease. Such a
system prevails in England and might prove beneficial here,
although the complexities of our practice statutes are not
such as to cry out very loudly for a change. To allow the
courts to act in this matter without control by the General
Assembly will require a new constitutional provision.
(c) Organization. The present Constitution covers in
considerable detail the organization of the various courts.
Undoubtedly, it goes too far in this direction. If, for instance, the city of Philadelphia needs an additional judge in
each of its common pleas courts, it should not require a
constitutional amendment to make that possible.1 6 The
Constitution should provide for the organization and jurisdiction of all the courts only in the most general way, leaving
to the General Assembly, or perhaps in some cases to local
governments, the right to fix the number of courts, the number of judges and the respective jurisdictions of the several
courts. Provided that a court is available for every suitor
where justice may be administered by a judge learned in
the law, the Constitution should not concern itself with
further particulars of organization. Changing requirements
in that respect can best be met by the General Assembly.
5.

TAXATION AND FINANCE.

(a) Uniformity. Article 9 of the present Constitution
deals with this subject. The opening words of its first section are of particular importance, requiring that "all taxes
shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects." The
1 See Constitution of Louisiana, Article 96.
16 Commonwealth v. Hyneman,

242

Pa. 244.
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necessity of inserting such a provision can hardly be overemphasized. To permit special legislation in the field of
taxation would open the door to the confiscation of the
property -of the minority by the majority in temporary control. The direct inheritance tax act of May 12, 1897, P. L.
56, failed to meet this constitutional requirement as well as
others, because it exempted from its provisions personal
The existing $250 exempproperty to the value of $5ooo.1
tion in the collateral inheritance tax law is only saved because it dates from 1826 and is therefore not affected by
constitutional provisions which are prospective only.
The General Assemblies of 1917 and 1919 have passed
a joint resolution to amend the Constitution by adding a
proviso that "the subjects of taxation may be classified for
the purpose of laying graded or progressive taxes." This
proposition will be submitted to the voters on November 4,
I919. If such a proposition should at any time be approved by
the voters of the State, it will make it possible to tax the rich
man at a rate higher than the poor man, and will in that
respect follow the example of the Federal income tax law.
In debating the wisdom of such a proposition it should be
remembered that graded or progressive taxes may be made
equivalent to confiscation.
(b) Exemptions. The question of exemptions is also
worthy of consideration. The present Constitution allows
the General Assembly to exempt public property, churches,
cemeteries and charitable institutions. No one can quarrel
with the exemption of public property, for it simply saves
taking money out of one pocket to put it back into another.
There may, however, be objection to a continuation of the
exemption extended to churches and to charitable institutions
not conducted by the State. So long as the Constitution
permits such exemption it is inevitable that the General
Assembly will exempt. The value of tax exempt real estate
is enormous, amounting in Philadelphia alone to about $ioo,ooo,ooo. Add the value of funds held in trust for charitable
17 Cope's

Estate, 191 Pa. i.
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purposes' 8 and the total amount of taxes lost to the State
and local governments is seen to be very large.
There are two arguments in favor of the present constitutional provision. Churches and charities undoubtedly
lift a burden from governments; for this service they should
be recompensed by relief from taxation. To this it may be
answered that their activities, and particularly those of the
churches, should be supported entirely by those who are
willing to support them. Those who are content to worship
in a simple church should not be obliged individually to pay
higher taxes because certain of their neighbors claim exemption upon a large and expensive structure, which occupies
land otherwise valuable for business or domestic purposes.
And the man who goes to no church has a still more just
grievance. Our present system distributes the burden of
taxation unevenly. The same considerations apply to charities, but with less force, because their work is generally
approved by most of the community, and their property
holdings seldom exceed their actual needs.
The other argument in favor of the present constitutional provision arises from the purely permissive character
of the provision. The matter is left entirely to the General
Assembly, within certain bounds. If certain exemptions are
not to be allowed, it is the Legislature which must refuse
them. But the Legislature never will refuse them, as a
matter of fact, because every legislator will come to Harrisburg charged with a sense of responsibility to the interested
church members of his district, and conscious that a continuation of the status quo will disquiet no one very seriously.
(c) State Loans. Most of us have in the past been
proud of the fact that the Commonwealth had no bonded
debt, but most of us were glad to vote for the amendment
to the Constitution which will make it possible to spend
fifty millions on good roads. Should a constitutional amendment be required whenever the State wants to borrow for
any purpose other than the supply of casual deficiencies
in revenue and protection from aggression?
IsSee Mattern v. Canevin, 213 Pa. 588.
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In other states, restrictions with respect to the purpose,
amount and interest rate of State loans are common, and
in many, a popular referendum is required. If the borrowing of money by the State is restricted only by requiring a
referendum, it follows that the credit of the State and hence
the property of all its citizens may be pledged to an unlimited
extent to meet obligations incurred in times of unwise enthusiasm. The present provisions of our Constitution seem
to cover all urgent situations.
(d) Municipal Loans. The original limitation of Article 9, Section 8, upon the borrowing power of municipalities
was 7% of the assessed value of their taxable property, with
an extra 3% of grace for cities which had already exceeded
7%. By successive amendments the limit has been raised
until it is now io%. In calculating the debt there may be
excluded money borrowed to buy public utilities which will
pay for themselves in five years. In Philadelphia there
may be excluded the capitalized value of the preceding
year's earnings from such utilities. It is quite possible that
these limits will prove unsatisfactory in the coming years.
The problem could be solved by setting a limit which it
would be impossible to pass except by vote of a large majority,
say three-fourths or four-fifths, of the citizens concerned.
In some states the imposing of restrictions upon municipal
borrowing power is left to the Legislature.
6.

LocAL GOVERNMENTS.

(a) Home Rule. The measure of authority over local
governments exercised by the Constitution and by the General Assembly is very great. Article 14 of the Constitution
affirmatively requires all county officers to be elected and
prescribes eleven officers by name. Of these eleven it may
very properly be urged that the prothonotary and clerks of
the courts should be appointed by the court of Common
Pleas, that the office of coroner is an anachronism, that the
register of wills should be appointed by the Orphans' Court,
and that the surveyor and recorder of deeds, whose duties
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are purely non-political, should be appointed by the county
commissioners. This would leave sheriff, commissioners,
treasurer, controller, and district attorney to be elected.
No good reason appears why the Constitution should absolutely require all these eleven officers in every county and
require that they should all be elected.
By failing to restrict the General Assembly in the matter, the Constitution has permitted that body to interfere
in local affairs almost without limit, so long as the prohibition
of local and special legislation is respected. It follows that
by confining itself to approved classifications of cities, counties, etc., the Legislature can exercise entire control over
the forms of government of those units. It can prescribe
the thickness of beams in cities or it can state what shall be
subjects of taxation for township purposes. The temptation
to interfere, in fact the necessity of interfering, is apparent.
Should not the Constitution leave certain matters to the
uncontrolled discretion of the local units involved? Such
matters could be sanitation, police and fire regulations,
building codes, and other subjects which will readily suggest
themselves. So long as a citizen of the Commonwealth is
sure of proper protection for iils person wherever he may go
within the State, and so long as he is protected against unjust
taxes or other seizure of property, it does not seem important
that there should be absolute uniformity throughout the
State with respect to the conduct of local affairs. Of course,
with respect to form of government the advantages of uniformity are obvious.
7.

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS.

Article 16, which deals with this subject, is full of statutory matter. It establishes the right of cumulative voting,
forbids foreign corporations to do business in Pennsylvania
without appointing an agent upon whom process may be
served, provides in some detail for the issuing of securities
and for the increase of stock or of indebtedness, and makes
special provisions with respect to banking and telegraph
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companies. All of these are properly legislative matters
and as such should be left to the General Assembly to decide.
If this article turns the attention of its readers to the
importance of the constitutional questions which will shortly
confront us, and if it stirs in them a spirit of critical suggestion, and of careful thought with respect to these questions, it will have served its purpose.
Shippen Lewis.
Philadelphia,Pa., October i, 19x9.

